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This paper offers a critical assessment of REDD+ in Nigeria through a political ecology 
perspective. Focusing on questions of property rights and resource access, it maps the 
discursive articulations and contestations through which carbon rights are  being 
determined. It also shows how these articulations and contestations are linked to land and 
forest rights, and how they shape everyday access to the forest. Evidence from the Nigerian 
case suggests that factors that complicate rights and undermine access to resources for 
forest communities under REDD+ are immanent to the contested terrain constituted in part 
by REDD+ proposals, proponents’ discourses and practices geared towards securing the 
forest for REDD+. Efforts to secure property rights and guarantee the permanence of REDD+ 
forests align with economic, ecological and ideological aspirations of state and non-state 
actors to produce a regime of militarised protectionism. I demonstrate how, in addition to 
its material and symbolic facilitation of the emergent carbon forestry economy, militarised 
protectionism as a regime of exclusion also constitutes collateral political economies of 
‘more-than-carbon’ forest resources (such as timber and non-timber forest products) which 
perpetuate capital accumulation by the elites. It is this kind of exclusion–accumulation 
dialectic legitimised by carbon forestry claims that this paper describes as carbonised 
exclusion. The paper thus furthers debates on the political ecology of REDD+ and other 
carbon forestry projects, while productively engaging technocentric literature on REDD+ and 
property rights. 
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1.0      Introduction 
 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus sustainable forest 
management (REDD+) promises to transform rural landscapes, conserve forests and 
biodiversity, halt upward climate change trajectories, foster green development pathways, 
and bring prosperity to the rural poor (Angelsen et al., 2012; Hall, 2012). An important part 
of the emergent green economy, this global scheme has entailed a renewed valorisation of 
forest and forestland with wide-ranging implications for how new forest commodities (such 
as carbon offsets) and other forests resources (such as timber and non-timber forest 
products) are claimed, accessed, protected, used, and governed in tropical countries 
(McAfee, 2015; Leach and Scoones, 2015). 
This paper focuses on property rights and resource control, a problematic aspect of REDD+ 
readiness implementation, and one that is already generating intense debates. In this 
journal alone, recent contribution to debates on property relations and resource control in 
carbon projects is significant (see for instance, Cavanagh et al. 2015; Dwyer et al., 2016; 
Hackett, 2015; Nel, 2015; Osborne, 2015). Increasingly, critical scholars show how REDD+ 
might, in fact, be reversing historical gains in decentralisation and devolution of control over 
forest resources (Barr and Sayer, 2012; Leach and Scoones, 2015; Phelps et al., 2010). 
Resource practices and property relations are being re-worked in ways that perpetuate 
regimes of unequal power relations, loss of local resource control, and various forms of 
dispossession (Arhin and Atela, 2015; Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Cavanagh and 
Benjaminsen, 2014; Mahanty et al., 2012, 2013; Milne and Adams, 2012; Nel,  2015; 
Osborne, 2015). These are also linked to forms of carbon violence, manifest in the 
resurgence of “fence-and-fine” protectionist approaches, part of which Leach and Scoones 
(2015 p.7) call “fortress carbon”. They are also connected to the growing securitization of 
the forest landscape, as states and non-state actors attempt to ‘secure’ property rights for 
REDD+ and combat organised criminal networks which purportedly undermine forest 
conservation and REDD+ efforts (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014; Dwyer 
et al., 2016; Nellemann, 2012). Nevertheless, there are cases showing indigenous 
communities consolidating land right under carbon forestry projects especially in the 
Americas (e.g. Hackett, 2015; Kull et al., 2015). These would appear to be isolated cases 
amidst widespread concerns about (re)centralisation, protectionism, and violence. 
These concerns are also important in Nigeria’s case, where REDD+ claims to save the 
country’s ‘last rainforests’ and a part of Conservation International-designated global 
biodiversity hotspot (Oyebo et al., 2012; Myers et al., 2000). Efforts to enact REDD+ in 
Nigeria are driving significant institutional and structural changes at national, state (sub- 
national) and local levels. At the state level, REDD+ is being implemented as a total forest 
management strategy in mainly community forests and state forest reserves. In preparation 
for REDD+, the pilot state in Nigeria halted timber-based revenue targets, declared a total 
ban on logging, and created a militarised Anti-deforestation Task Force to enforce the ban. 
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Under these conditions, not only are community rights to forest carbon uncertain, but also 
their existing rights to land and forest resources are threatened. Nigeria’s REDD+ thus 
foregrounds questions about property rights and access to resources. 
Drawing on the discursive and the materialist political-economic basis of political ecology, 
this paper analyzes the contested spaces within which property rights and access to 
resources are being negotiated in the context of Nigeria’s REDD+.3 It pursues two linked 
overarching arguments. First, it responds to an important body of work on REDD+ property 
relations and tenure which has continued to approach these issues from a more 
technocentric point of view. Here REDD+ is often taken to be externally positioned to tenure 
problems, to which REDD+ implementers are finding ‘interim solutions’ (see Awono et al., 
2014; Bolin et al., 2013; Resosudarmo et al., 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2013). Such  a  view, 
which largely effaces important political economic details, tells us too little about how and 
why property rights and access are changing under REDD+, whose interest is served  by 
these changes, who benefits, who loses, and how is the environment transformed in the 
process (Karsenty, 2008; Osborne, 2015). This paper thus argues that REDD+ does not 
maintain a position of exteriority to tenure complexity in locales, but that  the scheme 
drives, and, is in turn, shaped by property relations which emerge through interactions of 
power among actors who pursue various interests in REDD+ (Mahanty et al., 2012; Milne, 
2012; Cavanagh et al., 2015; McGregor et al., 2015). It shows in the case of Nigeria that the 
factors that complicate property rights and access to resources for communities are 
immanent to the contested terrain constituted in part by REDD+ proposals, proponents’ 
discourses and practices geared towards securing the forest for REDD+. 
Second, in taking forward a political ecology of carbon forestry, this paper argues that the 
material enforcement of property rights most evident in efforts to secure the forest for 
value creation in REDD+ often also constitutes collateral political economies of ‘more-than- 
carbon’ forest resources such as timber and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). Declaring 
processes of exclusion as “the necessary... corollary” for value creation in carbon forestry 
also suggests a tacit assumption that the former’s raison d’être is to facilitate a grand 
political economy of carbon (Cavanagh et al., 2015 p73; Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014). Yet, 
this paper contends that exclusionary processes that underpin the emergent carbon 
economy – insofar as they rework existing resource relations – also constitute collateral  political 
 
 
 
 
3 By property rights (or rights), I mean enforceable authority wielded by an individual or group to take certain 
actions in relation to a resource or in relation to others over that resource. Property right is considered in 
terms of “bundle of rights” with layers of authority (Agrawal and Ostrom, 1999; Karsenty et al., 2014). This 
layered right includes, respectively, right of access, right of withdrawal, right of management, right to exclude 
others. These rights are cumulative, with each right already including the preceding right. The sum of these 
rights is vested only in the ‘owner’ or ‘proprietor’. Meanwhile, tenure is taken to mean “systems of rights, 
rules, institutions, and processes regulating resource access and use” (Cotula and Mayers, 2009 p.V). To secure 
tenure is to make certain – de jure and de facto – “that a person’s rights to land will be recognized by others 
and protected in cases of specific challenges” (FAO, 2002 p 18). 
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economies of ‘more-than-carbon’ forest resources.4 This implies malleable processes of 
capital accumulation not just through actual “decarbonisation” (Bumpus and Liverman 
2008), but through more-than-carbon economies, legitimised by carbon forestry claims. It is 
this nuanced exclusion – accumulation dialectic that is here conceived as carbonised 
exclusion.5 I illustrate this argument through the case REDD+ in Nigeria where carbon 
forestry claims justify a political economy constituted around a militarised protectionism 
that curtails local access to resources while perpetuating elite capital accumulation and 
forest decline. 
The paper thus contributes to the growing political ecologies of carbon forestry in Africa and 
particularly, in Nigeria where REDD+ has so far received surprisingly little  analytical 
attention (for exceptions see Nuesiri, 2016; Asiyanbi, 2015).6 It also extends the political 
ecologies of natural resources in Nigeria to the terrain of carbon forestry.7 The paper draws 
on empirical materials gathered through in-depth interviews with 58 key REDD+ actors 
(drawn from government, NGOs, international REDD+ partners and local communities), 
participant observation, and analysis of project documents between October 2013 and 
September 2014. Data so gathered were analysed using critical discourse analysis  and 
critical narrative in the qualitative research tradition. The paper begins with a background 
on REDD+ in Nigeria (2.0), before pursuing the key concerns of this paper under three major 
headings: Claiming land, forest, and carbon (3.0); everyday politics of access (4.0); and 
carbonised exclusion (5.0). 
 
 
2.0     REDD+ in Nigeria’s Cross River 
 
Activities leading to the commencement of REDD+ in Nigeria began in 2008, in Cross River 
State, one of the 37 federating units of the country. The state’s 7361.7 km2 of tropical 
rainforest is a significant portion of the remaining tropical rainforest in Nigeria and part of 
an important biodiversity hotspot (Oyebo et al., 2010; Myers et al., 2000). An environment 
summit convened in Cross River State in June 2008, championed mainly by local and 
international environmental NGOs, declared a crisis in the forestry sector. The  summit 
issued a communiqué with the top three recommendations asking the state to ‘halt [the] 
revenue target based on timber exploitation’, ‘declare a two-year moratorium on logging’ 
and ‘initiate action to take advantage of the carbon credit market’. The then state  governor 
 
 
4 The ubiquity of carbon in all forest biomass means that ‘more-than-carbon’ rather than ‘non-carbon’ is a 
preferred expression for other forest uses other than for carbon offset. 
5 Attention to these ‘more-than-carbon’ political economies in REDD+ is quite important given minimal 
implementation of REDD+ on the ground and a growing trend of non-materialization (or delayed 
materialisation) of actual carbon benefits. It can also potentially stimulate new debates on political economies 
in other domains of value creation, authorised by REDD+ (Asiyanbi, 2015; Turnout et al., 2016). 
6 Schoneveld (2014) and Abua et al. (2013) referenced Nigeria’s REDD+ in Cross River, as part of discussions on 
large scale agricultural acquisitions and historical conservation interventions respectively. 
7 See for instance Watts (2013) and Obi (2010) for political ecologies of petroleum; Von Hellermann (2013) on 
timber forestry; and Ojo (2012) on bitumen 
Cross River peninsular to Cameroon (see Okafor-Yarwood, 2015). 
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Liyel Imoke thus promptly began a process of institutional restructuring in the forestry 
sector. He would halt revenue target from forestry, impose a logging moratorium across the 
whole state, and set up a militarised Anti-deforestation Task Force (henceforth ATF) to 
enforce the ban.8 Yet, the drive to implement REDD+ must also be understood against the 
state’s lingering financial crisis, to which Governor Imoke had sought what he called creative 
funding strategies; this has included carbon finance along with new drive to attract 
agricultural, mining, and industrial investments (Imoke, 2012; Schoneveld, 2014 cf. Karsenty, 
2016).9 
These pioneering REDD+ efforts by Cross River meant that Nigeria would adopt a ‘nested 
approach’ to REDD+, where implementation proceeds simultaneously at the state (sub- 
national) and national levels, since REDD+ requires a national carbon accounting system. 
This paper focuses on state (sub-national) level implementation, where most of the 
demonstration activities are went on. Following three years (2008 – 2011) of groundwork, 
the UNREDD approved a US$4 million readiness fund for Nigeria in October 2011. More 
funding (US$ 3.6 million) came from the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
(FCPF) after the country’s Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) was approved in December 
2013. Additional support is provided by the California-led Governors’ Climate and Forests 
Task Force (GCF). REDD+ proposals marked out three REDD+ pilot areas  largely in 
community forests in Cross River, as shown in Figure 1. Foreign consultants working with 
government bureaucrats and local NGO actors drafted the Nigeria’s REDD+ proposals, which 
are now being implemented at the national, state and local levels (see NPD, 2011; R-PP, 
2013). 
Nigeria’s REDD+ builds on more than a century of colonial and postcolonial conservation 
interventions. More recent conservation efforts in Cross River peaked with the creation of 
the Cross River National Park between 1989 and 1991, and the management of enclave and 
buffer zone communities under an Integrated Conservation and Development  Project 
(ICDP). Most analysts agree that these interventions generally  yielded poor conservation 
and livelihood outcomes (Abua et al., 2013; Asiyanbi, 2016; Oates, 1999). Yet, they catalysed 
the rise of an NGO sector and the growth of socio-environmental entrepreneurs, many of 
whom are prominent in the REDD+ processes (see Abua et al., 2013; Nuesiri, 2016; cf Rowe, 
2015).  Many  NGO  leaders  were  trained,  employed  or  had  volunteered  in  these earlier 
 
 
8 The moratorium, a total ban on all forms of timber extraction throughout Cross River State, was declared late 
2008 but began to take effect in January 2009. It was initially declare as a temporary measure for two years as 
part of the preparation for the shift to a carbon forestry regime. It was later extended indefinitely as 
proponents of carbon forestry began wielding the moratorium as an important demonstration of the state’s 
political will to pursue REDD+. 
9 By 2008 Cross River state had accumulated huge financial debts mainly from failed spectacular tourism- 
oriented projects such as the 50 billion naira Tinapa business resort. Its oil-based federal allocation has also 
been declining consequent upon the transfer of its crude oil wells to neighbouring Akwa Ibom state. This 
followed a ruling by the International Court of Justice over Bakassi Peninsular which transferred the erstwhile 
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interventions that sought to promote a more participatory conservationism.10 Likewise, 
many of the support-zone communities of the Cross River National Park are listed as part of 
the REDD+ pilot. These communities, composed mainly of farmers, hunters, and forest 
gatherers, make up 70% of the rural population of Cross River whose livelihoods depend on 
the forests (NPD, 2011 p.11). Among these scores of REDD+ pilot communities, represented 
as clusters in Figures 1, are Ekuri, Iko-Esai and Mbe mountain communities which have long 
histories of forest management and conservation which are recognised nationally and 
internationally (Okali and Eyog-Matig, 2004; UNEP, 2012). 
Given the importance of tenure and property rights to REDD+ (Sunderlin et  al., 2013), 
efforts to implement REDD+ have also entailed various attempts to secure the forest and 
guarantee the permanence of areas – in both community forests and state forest reserves – 
marked out for REDD+ (See Figure 1). Besides being a standard REDD+  requirement, these 
efforts are also linked to a range of aspirations among REDD+ proponents. One is the state’s 
commitment to using forest protection as a demonstration of ‘political will’ for REDD+, thus 
guaranteeing continued funding from international REDD+ partners. Another is the will to 
‘save Nigeria’s last rainforest’. This is linked to ecological and ideological imperatives 
founded upon long-held beliefs especially among conservationists that Cross River forests 
were “natural” and “pristine” (Alashi, 1999 p.143), and that they showed “no signs of 
human” (Oates, 1999 p.137). This belief is partly reflected in the desire of  REDD+ 
proponents in the state and among conservation NGOs to pursue conservation at the scale 
of the ecosystem, and their insistence on regenerating the forest with only trees species 
considered indigenous, and thus ‘natural’. Saving Nigeria’s last rainforest only grants a sense 
of violent urgency to the central requirement of clarifying carbon property rights and 
securing forests for the creation of economic value in Nigeria’s emergent carbon forestry 
economy. This requirement is evident in project proposals and discourses of project’s 
proponents which articulate with existing land and forest laws within a contested terrain 
that reinforces the status quo of state control of land and forest. Importantly, material 
efforts to secure the forest for REDD+ manifest as forms of carbonised exclusion, in which 
carbon credentials justify state resource control and a regime of militarised protectionism 
which curtails local resource access while perpetuating both elite capital accumulation and 
forest decline. This paper now turns to these dynamics by considering the discursive spaces 
within which carbon property relations are being forged and the material everyday politics 
of access and the emergent carbonised exclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 WWF UK and Nigerian Conservation Foundation (NCF) played leading roles in these interventions which 
would lead to the proliferation and consolidation of foreign registered (e.g. Pandrillus, World Conservation 
Society, Cercopan) and local NGOs (e.g. Living Earth Nigeria, NGO Coalition for the Environment, and Green 
Concern for Development). 
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Figure 1: Map of Cross River State showing the location of the three pilot sites for REDD+ 
 
Map Source: Cross River State Forestry Commission; Data Source: Oyebo et al., 2010 
 
Notes on REDD+ Pilots: I   - Mbe-Afi River Forest Reserve cluster: 50,000ha of forest, 18 communities 
II  - Ekuri-Iko Esai cluster: 94,000ha of forest, 12 communities 
III - Mangrove cluster: 58,000ha of forest, >50 communities 
Pilot I 
Pilot II 
Pilot III 
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3.1 Claiming land, forest and carbon 
 
Forest carbon offsets, like any other commodity or resource, is thoroughly social. The 
making of carbon offsets from forests entails a complex and dynamic assemblage of actors, 
visions, processes, institutions, and practices, across multiple scales (Osborne, 2015; 
Mahanty et al., 2012; Li, 2014). The multiplicity of interests within this assemblage, and the 
historically contested nature of tropical forests also make forest carbon an eminent political 
resource (McGregor et al., 2015; Bryant, 1997; Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001). Yet, an 
important part of this socio-political assemblage is the ordering of the discursive spaces 
within which actors stake, negotiate and contest claims to the commodity. The need for 
such discursive ordering and clarification of claims has been described by analysts as a key 
requirement in REDD+ (Karsenty, et al., 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2013). It is also well reflected 
in public discourses of REDD+ in Nigeria.11 For instance, the communiqué of the important 
National Validation Workshop held in February 2011 to validate the draft National 
Programme Document (NPD) states, as a matter of priority, the need for “due clarification 
and definition of carbon rights and land tenure matters as they affect REDD+” (NPD, 2011 
p7). For proponents of REDD+, an important starting point for making and clarifying claims 
to carbon is through articulation with existing laws and institutions guiding rights to land 
and forests (Mahanty et al., 2013).12 
3.2 Articulations with legal-institutional basis 
 
The most significant law regarding land rights in post-independence Nigeria is the Land Use 
Decree of 1978 (later adopted by the civilian government as the Land Use Act – LUA of 
1991). The LUA vests all land in the Governor of each state who holds it in trust for the 
people (LUA, 1990). This law builds on the legacy of the British Colonial Administration in 
Northern Nigeria under Lord Frederick Lugard, who claimed all Northern Nigerian land for 
the British colonial state, based, ironically, on the indigenous Fulani Maliki law (see 
Mabogunje, 2010). The LUA thus effectively extended state control beyond forestlands and 
economic tree species which had systematically come under state regulation through the 
elaboration and practice of scientific forestry especially in colonial Nigeria (Von Hellermann, 
2013). But the LUA would also reinforce the state’s hold on forests, especially since the 
National Forest Policy (NFP) passed in 2006 only deferred to the LUA in specifying forest 
ownership: “the 1978 Land Use Act gives the lead on questions of land ownership and 
tenure. All land is owned, including trees growing on it either by government or private 
owners.” (NFP, 2006 p.68)13. Nevertheless, the National Forestry Policy, like the new Cross 
River State forestry law, does no more than affirm forest communities as stakeholders, with 
 
 
11 Following understanding of discourses by Escobar, (1999), this paper takes a broader understanding of 
discourse beyond narrow concern with linguistic regularities. 
12 By articulation, I refer to kind of strategic linking and appropriation of elements into an alliance – in this case 
emergent claims around carbon and the suite of extant laws defining specifying rights and access to resources. 
13 Nigeria’s National Forest Policy is an ‘on-paper’ policy, since the federal government has no legal claim to 
forest or land. States formulate and enforce their own policies and laws. 
9 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Elsevier in GeoForum Vol. 77, 146-156. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.10.016 
Accepted version made available in SOAS Research Online under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 License at: 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23255/  
  
 
recognised forest management efforts (NFP, 2006). In short, as in many other post-colonial 
tropical countries where formal and customary land claims overlap, the state retains a de 
jure right to land and forest while communities’ de facto rights are recognised to varying 
extent (cf. Cavanagh et al., 2015; Nel and Hill, 2013). 
So how are the proponents of REDD+ invoking this existing legal-institutional framework? 
One important way to understand this is to turn to REDD+ proposals. For instance, the 
REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP, 2013 p52) submitted to the World Bank in 
2013 notes that “the National Land Use Act vests ownership of all land in the state 
government and fails to formally recognize community tenure”. This, the proposal observes, 
presents a problem since “lack of tenure security discourages long-term investment, and 
given the lack of finance and capacity to adequately enforce protection of dedicated 
conservation areas, much of the forests are left to predatory and opportunistic behaviour 
from companies and individuals.”(R-PP, 2013 p52; see also Oyebo et al., 2010 p26). Thus, 
REDD+ proponents put forward a proposal to guarantee “forest use rights” to communities: 
Without tenure, communities have little vested interest in their (forest) protection. 
Providing forest use rights to households, or communities where they can benefit 
from the area, will provide incentives for them to protect the area and help to stop 
encroachment. It will also ensure that local communities will benefit from REDD+. 
Therefore, any National REDD+ Programme must contain an element of ensuring 
forest use rights to local forest groups (R-PP, 2013 p52). 
Remarkable here is the reduction of “community tenure” to “forest use rights” which 
reflects reluctance to suggest a legally defensible ownership and control rights for 
communities. This tacit reluctance is emblematic of the contradiction between the rhetoric 
of tenure security that, as proponents claim above, is supposedly required for long-term 
investments like REDD+, and the persistent “fear of the poor and of their claims to 
resources” in both colonial and postcolonial conservation (Peluso and Watts, 2001 p7-8). 
Also notable is the apparent utilitarian instrumentalist logic behind the call to guarantee use 
rights for communities. This logic suggests that the desirability of securing community 
tenure rests on the grounds that communities would, in their own interest, look after the 
forests if they are made to benefit from it (Resosudarmo et al., 2014). But this logic, in turn, 
arose mainly from the state’s “lack of finance and capacity to adequately enforce 
protection” without the help of communities (R-PP, 2013 p52). A critical implication of this is 
that once the state is able to adequately enforce protection of dedicated REDD+ areas 
(including community forests mapped out for REDD+) – rendering them available – then 
guaranteeing even community use right might lose priority. 
The recognition of the weakness of community tenure under REDD+ and a tacit reluctance 
to decisively address it run through the discourses of REDD+ proponents across the state, 
NGOs, and international REDD+ partners. Foresters’ reluctance to yield full control over the 
forest   to   communities   reflects   well-known   professional,   even   existential imperatives 
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(Interview Forestry Director; cf. Blaikie, 2006), while local and foreign NGOs often weigh the 
prospect of community tenure security against “what they understand to be in their 
interest” (cf. Bryant, 2005 p203). Thus, what is clearly evident in REDD+ proponents’ 
articulation with existing legal-institutional framework is a sense of ambiguity and a tacit 
evasion of the need to guarantee community ownership right over land and forest (cf. 
Biddulph, 2010). This pattern of ambiguity and evasion in Nigeria and in REDD+ projects 
more broadly render the determination of carbon right even more complex, thereby 
allowing for a whole range of possibilities among the complex array of stakeholders that 
carbon forestry summons (see Mahanty et al., 2012; Resosudarmo et al., 2014). So, how do 
all these relate to how REDD+ proponents and communities lay claim to carbon? 
3.3 Claiming carbon: proponents’ discourses 
 
REDD+ proponents make a number of sometimes contradictory claims about carbon rights. 
First, there are propositions in early REDD+ documents such as the Preliminary Assessment 
Report suggesting that carbon rights be decoupled from land rights (Oyebo et al, 2010 p94). 
Some proponents of the scheme maintain that nobody owns carbon and that though there 
are legislations on the ownership of timber and land, there is currently no document 
specifying any pattern for carbon ownership (Interview, State REDD+  Coordinator; 
Interview, REDD+ Consultant). These proponents warn that if current tenure arrangement 
which puts all land under the state control is strictly translated into carbon rights “that 
would be a disaster” since it will marginalise communities and other claimants to carbon 
benefits such as investors and consultants. This is consistent with a view in REDD+ literature 
that “linking ‘carbon rights’ to land tenure could jeopardize the objective of securing tenure 
rights for communities and local people, since ... it could encourage governments to refrain 
from transferring property rights” thereby fostering recentralisation of resource governance 
(Karsenty et al., 2014 p7; Phelps et al., 2010). 
Second, later REDD+ proposals are in fact proposing such links between carbon rights and 
land rights, with specific reference to state ownership. For instance, the readiness proposal 
submitted to the World Bank in 2013 notes that while “legal instruments will be needed in 
order to define carbon rights and the associated benefit sharing mechanisms in any REDD+ 
endeavour, state ownership would consequently only apply if the land was formally state- 
owned” (R-PP, 2013 p60). This same document recognizes that “the National Land Use Act 
vests ownership of all land in the state government and fails to formally recognize 
community tenure” (R-PP, 2013 p52). This begins to clearly suggest that both the ambiguity 
and the deference to the status quo in REDD+ policy documents are serving to entrench 
state right over carbon. This was not lost on the World Bank assessors of the proposal who 
demanded that “greater clarity on carbon rights is required given state ownership of the 
land” (World Bank, 2013 p4). NGOs critical of this tendency have mobilized communities to 
resist  the evident  threat to community rights (Environmental Rights Action/Friends of    the 
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Earth Nigeria, 2011).14 As such, there is a strong suggestion in more substantive REDD+ 
documents to link rights to carbon, land, and forest. 
Third, some REDD+ proponents suggest that carbon rights should focus more on sharing 
rights to benefit from carbon among relevant actors (Interview REDD+ Consultant; R-PP, 
2013). This aligns with the view of carbon right as a bundle of rights with actors having 
different rights within the bundle (cf. Karsenty et al., 2014). However, even this still entails a 
clarification of the ‘owner’ in whom the cumulative rights are invested, including the right to 
fully exclude others. While proponents might claim that the ownership right to carbon from 
Nigeria’s REDD+ is yet to be determined, the exercise by the state of the right to exclude 
others and protect the forest for the purpose of REDD+ is an indication of who has the rights 
that matter, not least the right to exclude others. As we shall see later in this article, these 
rights lie with the state. But state claims are never completely and uniformly pursued. They 
are often limited, challenged and even transformed by community counter-claims (Beymer- 
Farris and Bassett, 2012; Mahanty et al., 2012; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). So, how do 
communities lay claim to carbon? 
3.4 Claiming carbon: Community discourses 
 
Communities such as Ekuri and Iko-Esai whose forests are being readied for REDD+ in Cross 
River have historically claimed de facto ownership of forests through customary institutions, 
and every day practices of use, management, and protection (Bisong and Andrew-Essien, 
2010; Jimoh et al., 2012). These rights are also fostered partly by different kinds of 
recognition from actors including NGOs, donors, development agencies and researchers 
(Okali and Matig, 2004; UNEP, 2012). Some of these communities, especially those in the 
Ekuri-Iko Esai REDD+ cluster, do not differentiate between their forest claims and carbon 
rights. For them, statements such as “our forest absorbs carbon” leave no questions – at 
least in their minds – about who owns carbon in their forests  (Interviews, Community 
Leader and Resource Manager). Although some community members are also keenly aware 
of the possibility that communities might be denied rights to carbon benefits, their 
reasoning is based less on doubts over ownership rights than over the possibility that REDD+ 
benefits might be captured by elites (Interview, Community Leader; Interview, Community 
Member). 
Also reinforcing community claims to carbon is the perceived and anticipated sense of 
control that these communities sometimes express over the process of carbon 
measurement, accounting, and transaction. For instance, a community resource leader 
asserted: “our people would do the measuring. So at least we would be able to find out   the 
 
 
14 NGOs critical of REDD+ have organised a number of workshops with communities and members of the 
general public to discuss REDD+, its implementation and its potential adverse impacts on communities. These 
workshops have issued communiqués and circulated more critical accounts of REDD+ in efforts to sensitize 
communities to challenge the excesses of REDD+. In my interviews with them, community members have 
referred to these workshops as sources of alternative REDD+ discourses by which they evaluate and challenge 
the claims and promises of REDD+ proponents (see Lang, 2011). 
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truth about carbon content from people who would do the measuring. And we know the 
price of carbon... it is we who would tell them what carbon is in our forest and what it costs 
and we will know what our share of the benefit will be” (Interview, Community Resource 
Manager). Community youths confidently described how a machine will be brought by 
project proponents for them to use in measuring carbon, and how they will directly be in 
charge of the project (Interview, Community Youth Leader). Invocation of REDD+ safeguard 
conditionalities, especially Free Prior and Informed Consent by some REDD+ communities 
also reinforce community claims to forest and carbon (Interviews, Community Resource 
Managers).15 
Nevertheless, the sense of control and ownership of carbon and forests expressed by 
communities does not preclude a readiness to share benefits from carbon, as gathered from 
community resource managers, and communities histories of shared access to land, forest 
and farmland (Interview, Community Leader and Resource Manager). However, tension 
ensues when communities are denied ownership right to carbon and other resources or 
when they are marginalised in the distribution of carbon benefits. An example is the state- 
proposed carbon credit sharing formula for REDD+ benefit which has been quietly included 
in the appendices of the new “Forestry Regulation and Tariffs for market and transportation 
of forest products and other forestry prescribed fees” dated August 2012.16 The proposal 
which allocated the least proportion (10%) of carbon benefits in all forest types to 
communities has been challenged by community leaders (Interview Community Leader). 
Meanwhile, communities had received (at least in theory) up to 70% of timber royalty prior 
to the moratorium. 
As such, indications in government laws, REDD+ documents, and proponents’ discourses 
reveal that forest communities occupy a less certain position with respect to carbon rights 
and rights to forest and land (cf Asiyanbi, 2015; Schoneveld, 2014). And since the material 
and the spatial basis for timber and carbon significantly overlap, the retention of the forest 
as carbon stock precludes its availability for a whole range of other uses, claims of REDD+ 
‘co-benefits’ notwithstanding. This is even more so in Cross River where proponents of 
REDD+ seek to implement REDD+, not as one of various forest management strategies, but 
as an overarching and total forest strategy. The co-ordinator of REDD+ in Cross River who 
doubles as the Chair of the State Forestry Commission Board observes: “...before we came 
in, the mindset and the tradition towards forestry are that it is for exploitation of timber, 
that's all. But we rather felt there is a need to replace that with carbon  forestry...” 
(emphasis mine). The concurrent materiality of timber and carbon means that forest access, 
an  important  dimension  of  property  rights,  must  change  as  proponents  attempt      the 
 
 
15 Safeguards are standard principles outlined by REDD+ donor agencies, and which recipient states must abide 
by in mitigating the negative impacts of projects on forest communities, indigenous peoples and the 
environment. 
16 The inclusion of a carbon benefit sharing code in this document never came to wider knowledge of most 
actors involved in REDD+ and was never the subject of a prior public consultation or debate. However, the 
document itself is available in the Forestry Commission headquarter and with few community leaders. 
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complex and contested process of replacing timber forestry with a total carbon forestry 
strategy. It is in recognition of this that the state declared a total logging ban in all forest 
areas in the first place. The discursive contestations so far analysed here are not merely 
consistent with various everyday efforts to secure forest areas for REDD+, they, in fact, 
authorise and legitimise these material processes which manifest in changing local access 
and ultimately as forms of carbonised exclusion. 
 
 
4.0       Everyday politics of access 
 
Access is understood as the most basic of the bundle of rights in a resource, which is the 
right to benefit from the resource (Agrawal and Ostrom, 1999). Yet, following Ribot and 
Peluso (2003), access is also broadened to include the ability to derive benefits from a 
resource. This suggests that factors that mediate access to a resource go beyond formal 
right and recognition of this right. They include the totality of the agency, processes, and 
relations which enable or constrain an individual’s chances of benefiting from a resource. 
 
Indications of impending changes to community access to forest resources began to surface, 
first, in policy documents. Proposals marked out the entirety of forest areas held by pilot 
communities as REDD+ areas, with the important implication that proposals left no forest 
area for community livelihood and cultural activities (see Figure 1). Further, the Project Idea 
Notes (PIN) for REDD+ specified that: "the project is viable and attractive to carbon finance 
only if the project area includes the multiple community forests and forest reserves. A 
project considering only one of these areas would not be viable on its own" (Oyebo et al., 
2010 p.89). Hence the clustering of forests and communities that lay claim to them. 
Clustering became the basis of a whole range of strategies to rescale, discipline, and render 
local forest governance legible to carbon grants (from international REDD+ institutions such 
as the World Bank and the UN), and ultimately global carbon market. This was based not on 
any pre-existing community ties but solely on forest contiguity and biodiversity potentials 
(see Ravilious et al., 2010). Unsurprisingly, this process that attempts to re-work existing 
community governance arrangements is stoking tension among communities. 
An example is the boundary tension the project is stoking between Ekuri and Iko Esai, the two 
most prominent communities in the Ekuri-Iko Esai cluster. Iko Esai had contacted a REDD+ 
consultant (through a letter dated 17 February 2010) requesting “the sponsors  of  the 
carbon credit scheme to really find out the true position of Iko Esai for an appropriate 
boundary between the Iko Esai and Ekuri people, before a concrete execution of this noble 
project”. This letter received no decisive attention. Yet, Ekuri community, warns that “the 
payment for ecosystem services is the underlying reason for Iko Esai’s claims and frantic 
attempts to illegitimately gain control of part of Ekuri’s forest … and any attempt by Iko Esai 
to trespass...will be severely resisted” (Ekuri Community, 2011 p 10-11). Meanwhile, in 
Mbe-Afi REDD+ cluster in the North of Cross River, Mbe Mountains forest communities   are 
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opposed to ‘clustering up’ with government-owned Afi forest area for fear of losing control 
of forest to the government. Mbe area had been under the close watch of conservationists 
who had proposed, without success, that the area which was considered an important 
wildlife corridor become part of the Cross River National Park between 1989 and 1991 
(Oates, 1999; Ite and Adams, 1998). As such, it would appear that the more proponents of 
REDD+ seek to cluster community forests on maps as a continuous stretch of forest, the 
more communities are driven to further inscribe their own forest boundaries on the ground, 
prompting deeper local tensions. 
Besides these smouldering tensions, clustered REDD+ pilot areas have become the focus of 
state efforts to secure property rights and retool local forest governance for REDD+. These 
efforts have entailed a two-pronged approach, namely incentivisation and militarised 
protectionism. However, since this incentivisation involves a one-time payment only to 
selected communities – an intervention that has proven inadequate to really incentivise 
forest conservation – the government has committed far more sustained efforts to 
protecting the forest.17 Militarised protectionism is so central to Nigeria’s REDD+ for a 
number of reasons. First, it represents the practical demonstration of the government’s de 
jure powers to control land and by extension forest resources even in community forests. 
Second, such a demonstration underpins international support for Nigeria’s REDD+, since it 
is often touted as a clear indication of ‘political will’ by the state government, and an 
indication that forest areas under REDD+ will be protected. Third, as a result of its material 
and symbolic facilitation of REDD+, militarised protectionism gains legitimacy as a hub 
around which a new exclusionary forest economy is organised, facilitating elite capital 
accumulation as wider public access to forest resources is curtailed. It is this third and the 
most important dimension that is at the core of carbonised exclusion. 
5.0       Carbonised exclusion 
 
As earlier noted, carbonised exclusion refers to the political economy of more-than-carbon 
forest resources which plays out through processes of exclusion and elite accumulation, 
justified by carbon forestry claims. Besides their role in facilitating the carbon economy, 
processes of enclosure and exclusion also constitute layers of ‘more-than-carbon’ political 
economies. In the case of Nigerian REDD+, carbon credentials justify entrenched state 
control and a regime of militarised protectionism which undermine community tenure 
security and local resource access while perpetuating both elite capital accumulation and 
forest decline. The rest of this paper will consider the key dimensions of carbonised 
exclusion  in the  Nigerian  case, focusing  on 1)  militarised protectionism  under REDD+;   2) 
 
 
 
17 With the ban on timber exploitation, the State government introduced a flat-rate payment called ‘loyalty’ to 
replace the erstwhile timber ‘royalty’ received by forest communities from all timber extraction. Loyalty was a 
one-time payment to each community at the value of 100,000 Nigerian Naira (or USD 625) per annum, though 
timber royalty to some of these communities was as high as one million Nigerian Naira (or USD 6,250) per 
annum. 
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political economy of timber revenue; and 3) local access to Non Timber Forest Products 
(NTFPs). 
5.1 Carbonised exclusion: militarised protectionism under REDD+ 
 
As part of efforts to kick-start REDD+ in Nigeria, Cross River State had set up an Anti- 
deforestation Task Force (ATF) to protect the forest for REDD+. The ATF became a full- 
fledged Unit in 2011 after an American primate conservationist was appointed its  Chair. 
That five out of the 11-member ATF Board are representatives of state military and security 
outfits (including the army, the navy, and the police) immediately indicates the militarised 
nature of the ATF. Critical scholars have sought to explain the convergence of wider and 
situated factors that underpin the ascendancy of discourses and practices of militarisation 
and securitization in conservation (see Lunstrum, 2014; Duffy, 2016; Cavanagh et al., 2015). 
Militarisation of REDD+ in Nigeria crystallized as the valorisation of the forest as carbon 
drives widespread criminalisation of the timber economy in Cross River. This intersects with 
the permanent militarisation of the Niger-Delta since the end of Nigeria’s Civil War in 1970, 
the imbuing of Cross River forests with a nationalist value as ‘Nigeria’s last rainforest’, and 
the alleged discovery of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Cross River forests which lie 
south of the notorious Sambisa forest base of the terrorist group, Boko Haram. 
 
In any case, the machinery of the ATF works with such efficacy that its Chair once boasted of 
its omnipresence: “we can be found anywhere, at any time. We show up anywhere in 
force!" (Green, 2009 p2). The ATF Board has co-opted some four dozens of state military 
and private security personnel, and a dispersed network of paid staff, paid informants and 
volunteers. In one year alone (2012) the ATF had reported a range of seized items: 105 
chainsaws, 46 vehicles, 24 canoes, and 4 tractors. In 2013, it recorded: 184 chainsaws, 12 
tractors, 89 vehicles, 20 canoes, 12 water pumping machines and hundreds of tons of 
timber. Cases of ‘forest offenders’ piled up so quickly that the ATF requested for the 
establishment of a mobile court which was established in February 2014. Yet, this efficacy 
which is violently exercised upon petty loggers and local communities – the main victims of 
the emergent carbonised exclusion – hides a significant level of illegality and deforestation 
that is, paradoxically, abetted by the ATF. For instance, the Legal Secretary who is also the 
Chief Prosecutor of the ATF confirms that up to 40% of the activities of the ATF itself is in 
illegal timber dealings and corrupt practices.18  Corruption in the ATF is a public   knowledge, 
having been variously revealed in state and national newspapers (e.g. Agbakwuru, 2012; 
Uzondu, 2012). What is difficult to assay is the extent.19 
 
 
 
18 The Legal Secretary of the Task Force, a civil servant seconded from the state ministry of justice to the Task 
Force, has a deep knowledge of, and often decried the illegalities in the ATF. 
19 These emergent dynamics hold implications and lessons for such initiatives as the European Union-led 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) of which Nigeria is a partner country. In the light of 
such impacts under REDD+ law enforcement, claims of synergy between REDD+ and FLEGT would require 
greater tempering. 
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Equally important is the spatial reach of the ATF, which is, in turn, an indication of carbon 
forestry’s spatial ambition. Though only three pilot areas had been mapped out for REDD+ 
demonstration (as shown in Figure 1), the logging ban covered the total area of the state. 
This total logging ban was also meant to forestall state-level leakage, an important 
conditionality in REDD+. But there is more to this totalizing scope. NGO champions of REDD+ 
and the ATF seek an expansive landscape approach to forest protection. For instance, the 
Chair of the ATF asserts: “Cross River must be managed in its entirety because it is an entire 
ecosystem that supports human beings” (Interview, ATF Chair). This pursuit of forest 
protection at the level of the ecosystem is linked to a long-standing pursuit among 
conservationists in Cross River to establish wildlife corridors across some of the current 
REDD+ forests, especially in the northern Cross River REDD+ cluster (Ite and Adams, 1998). 
All these are linked to the wider pursuit of saving Nigeria’s last rainforest, a cause which 
grants a sense of violent urgency to forest protection in Cross River partly by imbuing 
conservation spaces with nationalist values (see Lunstrum, 2014 for a similar process in 
South Africa’s Kruger National Park). Consequently, local access to forests has been 
significantly curtailed. 
The ways in which this militarised protectionism restructures forest access  manifest as 
forms of carbonised exclusion. Having discussed militarised protectionism as an important 
node of the emergent carbonised exclusion, the following subsections (5.2 and 5.3) consider 
two other dimensions of this phenomenon, that is, capital accumulation by the ATF and 
other elites, and the undermining of local livelihoods in the non-timber forest product 
sector. 
5.2 Carbonised exclusion: political economy of timber revenue 
 
An analysis of the political economy of the timber is one of the important ways through 
which to appreciate how state protectionism redistributes and concentrates economic 
power in the hands of select elites. If Harvey’s (2005 p.178) accumulation by dispossession 
“entails the loss of rights (through) fragmented and particular” processes, these processes in 
Nigeria’s REDD+ would include the deployment of violence and intimidation, surveillance, 
law enforcement and prosecution, and abetted illegal logging all of which combine to deny 
local resource users forest access but at the same time facilitate a timber economy attuned 
to elites’ interest. 
The ATF’s strategy for apprehending illegal logging mainly entails dispersed informants 
listening for chainsaws during on-going logging and conversion operations, and relaying 
information to the central ATF base. The other main strategy involves apprehending timber 
in transit or at points of sale (in timber markets). These mean that even if we put aside the 
illegalities it actively abets (as early noted), the ATF’s main strategy of apprehending loggers 
during and after felling does not effectively prevent actual cutting of trees which has 
somehow continued in the absence of any alternative provision for public wood needs. 
Rather  it  often  would  confiscate  timber  being  cut  or  those  already  cut.  An   important 
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implication of this is that the ATF, ironically, became the custodian of a thriving and 
significantly lucrative timber economy under the logging ban. Usually, confiscated timber is 
auctioned off, generating revenue. The ‘forest offender’ is prosecuted in the mobile court, 
and, if found guilty (which is often the case), imprisoned or made to pay significant fines – 
another revenue source. The cash flow of the ATF, shown in Table 1 is an important 
indication of how economic power is being concentrated, for instance, among  the few 
actors who command the ATF. 
 
Items Amount in Naira 
(NGN) 
12-month period 
(2012 -2013) 
Amount in US Dollars 
(USD) 
12-month period 
(2012 -2013) 
ATF revenue (A; from sales and 
fines) 
83,253,280 520,333 
ATF Subvention
 (Upkeep allowance) 
f  th  t t   (B) 
67,200,000 420,000 
ATF revenue remitted to state 
purse (C) 
20,311,920 126,950 
ATF-controlled capital =(A+B)-C 130,141,360 813,384 
 
Table 1: Summary of ATF accounts for 2012-2013 
 
Source: ATF Office, 2014 
 
Note: NGN 1 = USD 160 (Average rate as at December 2013) 
 
What is striking in Table 1, sourced from discretely handled ATF documents, is the huge size 
of the timber economy controlled by the ATF under a total logging ban.20 As its own legal 
adviser estimates, as much as 40% of the transactions and dealing of the ATF are illegal 
timber deals the proceeds of which escape formal records since they go into the pockets of 
the ATF elites and their patrons in the military and in the timber industry. As such, the 
revenue values reported here could as well be increased by as much as 40%. But even at the 
reported  sales  and  fines  proceeds  of  NGN  83,253,280  per  annum,  the  ATF  under       a 
moratorium regime still sets a record of timber revenue for the state in any 12-month 
period, as a review of historical timber revenue reveals. The total ‘running cost’ of the ATF in 
one year NGN 130,141,360 (after NGN 20,311,920 is remitted to the state government’s 
purse) is more than three times the annual budget for all forestry capital projects in the 
state. Put in another way, the ATF’s total revenue of USD 813,384 is more than the World 
Bank’s USD 3.6million grant for Nigeria’s REDD+ over five years. This means that despite the 
ban, and in spite of REDD+ funds, there is still sufficient incentive for the illegal timber 
economy under the ATF’s control to continue since the NGN 130,141,360 revenue pays   the 
 
 
20 Handing the ATF account information to me, a top ATF Officer noted that the account information had been 
kept away from most officers of the Forestry Commission and the general public. The former had accused the 
ATF of corruption, wastage of state resources and lack of transparency. 
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salaries, allowances and other running costs of the relatively small ATF band and their 
associates (Interview, ATF Legal Secretary; see also Uzondu, 2012). Another implication is 
that the timber royalty which hitherto went to communities now forms part of the ATF 
controlled capital within this formal, illegal timber economy. 
Yet, a corollary of this thriving illegal timber economy is continued deforestation. In fact, all 
indications point to a much greater level of deforestation under the logging ban for REDD+. 
For instance, foresters (both serving and retired), some conservation NGOs, and local 
communities note that deforestation has increased or at least continued like before, 
pointing to constant sighting of movement of timber on the road and in rivers, corrupt 
dealings among ATF staff, cheaper prices of wood in neighbouring states to which much of 
the illegal timber now go, and also increased forest clearing for farming by displaced small- 
scale loggers and timber dealers. This is further confirmed by deforestation figures from the 
Global Forest Watch, which showed that the extent of deforestation in Cross River state has 
more than doubled each successive year since 2012. As Figure 2 shows, while deforestation 
decreased in the early years of the ATF activities (2010 to 2012), the extent of deforestation 
more than doubled between 2012 and 2013, and between 2013 and 2014. In fact, the 
16,770 hectares of deforestation recorded in the three years 2012, 2013 and 2014 
accounted for about 80% of the 21,100 hectares total deforestation in 14 years between 
2001 and 2014. At least two things are clear: such staggering level of deforestation could 
not have occurred unaided by the ATF itself; and the repression of public wood needs in the 
early REDD+ years has bitten back, driving deforestation well past pre-REDD+ levels, even if 
commercial agricultural clearance in forest areas is also partly responsible for this rate (see 
Schoneveld, 2014). 
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Figure 2: Extent of Tree Cover Loss in Cross River State (2001 – 2014) 
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Source: Global Forest Watch, 2016 
 
Note: This data is based on 30% canopy density 
 
Meanwhile, REDD+ proponents continue to wield the appearance of forest protection as an 
important indication of political will to the more removed international REDD+ partners and 
funding agencies, who continue to grant financial and technical support for REDD+. The 
state REDD+ coordinator notes: “If we are able to generate income from non-timber 
activities, I feel very strongly that we can extend the logging moratorium” (Filou, 2010 p2). 
As such, REDD+ drives capital accumulation both in the supposedly criminalised timber 
economy (controlled by the ATF, the military, and powerful timber dealers), and in the 
carbon economy (controlled by other REDD+ proponents). Yet, these accumulation 
processes could only have been possible through forms of exclusion which have implications 
for local livelihood and public wellbeing. Here, I briefly highlight exclusion from non-timber 
forest products (NTFPs) to give an indication of impacts of carbonised exclusion outside the 
timber economy. 
5.3 Carbonised exclusion: accessing Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs) 
 
 
NTFPs such as fruits, vegetables, shrubs, canes, and wild game are an important part of 
community livelihood and wellbeing, since they are sources of food, clothing, shelter, 
ornaments, cultural artefacts, spiritual items, and income (Mfon et al., 2014; Ite and Adams, 
2000). Besides, communities directly tax commercial NTFP collectors to buoy communal 
livelihood. For instance, Ekuri, a prominent community and one with the greatest forest 
extent (33,000 hectares) in the Ekuri-Iko Esai REDD+ pilot cluster had described the 
contribution of NTFPs to community development: “proceeds from sale of  non-timber 
forest products and levies have enabled the initiative to build a 40km road, culverts, and 
bridges, so that farm and forest products can be transferred to markets, and that supplies 
can be brought for the building of two schools, a health centre and a civic centre....” (cited 
in UNEP, 2012 p.9). Though REDD+ methodologies do not seek to account for carbon in 
NTFPs, the ecosystem logic driving total enforcement of the logging ban in Cross River has 
meant that the ATF extended the logging ban to include a whole range of NTFPs including 
rattan, chewing stick, cattle stick, and firewood. This has been a very controversial move. It 
is a major  source of  conflict  between  the ATF and  foresters who seek  to ensure a   steady 
supply of NTFPs to the public21. Not only did the 2012 annual report of the Commission 
identify this conflict as a major institutional constraint, a director of  the Forestry 
Commission also laments: 
 
 
 
 
 
21 The Forestry Commission has historically regulated the extraction of woody and commercialised non-timber 
forest products such including rattan, chewing stick, cattle stick, and fire wood, by issuing permits to collectors 
and dealers. 
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There is a conflict between the Forestry Commission and the Task Force Unit over 
revenue generation from NTFPs. Okay, you say we should keep hands off timber, 
what about the non-timber forest products? Whenever our people issue permits to 
collectors of NTFPs, the Task Force would impound the products from the collectors. 
Things like chewing stick (Garcinia sp.), shepherd’s staff (Carpolobia sp.) – they 
impound these products from collectors so that people now question why they 
should come to the Forestry Commission to pay huge amount for permits when the 
products would be impounded by the Task Force. They now prefer to go extract 
these products illegally (Interview, Forestry Director). 
Local communities and NTFP collectors whose livelihoods and businesses have been 
undermined by the ATF have written several petitions to the Cross River State Governor 
without succour. One such petition accessed at the Forestry Commission was written by 
Agbokim community, dated 28 November 2011, and was addressed to the State Governor. 
The community made a desperate plea for rescue from “the untold hardship [which] Peter 
Jenkins, the Chair of the Anti-deforestation Task Force is impacting on us outside of the law” 
(Agbokim, 2011 p1). They petitioned that “after having obtained a valid document from the 
Forestry Commission to officially evacuate processed chewing stick from Agbokim village, he 
(Peter Jenkins) impounded our vehicle” (Agbokim, 2011 p1). Failing such petitions, 
communities have resorted to everyday acts of resistance including the defilement of the 
repressive ban to access NTFPs – acts that the ATF would regard as ‘pilfering’ and other 
‘forest offences’ (cf. Bryant, 1997; Scott, 1985). The ATF thus continued to arrest and 
prosecute local people for accessing NTFPs. For instance, the “forest offenders” arraigned in 
the mobile court which held on the premises of the Cross River State Secretariat in Calabar 
on 20 May, 2014 included two young men who were accused of “illegal transportation of 
cattle stick (Carpolobia sp)”, and were each sentenced to 1 year imprisonment or an option 
of fine amounting to NGN 470,000 ($ 2,930 or 26 times the national minimum monthly 
wage). Another was accused of “cutting of cane in the forest” and was discharged after 
payment of NGN 10,000 fine.22 Such were the NTFP cases for which people were arrested, 
harassed and arraigned in the forestry court. 
 
Taken together, the curtailment of access to NTFPs, the specific political economy of timber 
revenue, and the workings of the state’s militarised protectionism are interlinked 
dimensions of carbonised exclusion. Remarkable is how militarised protectionism began to 
form the core of an emergent political economy which is linked to timber-based capital 
accumulation by elites and the simultaneous exclusion of local communities from timber 
and non-timber forest resources. Yet this economy could not have been legitimised, even 
enabled without its material and symbolic facilitation of the carbon economy, and REDD+ to 
be precise. While carbonised exclusion continues to facilitate progress of the REDD+ 
readiness processes, ensuring the security of property in REDD+ forest and continuous   flow 
 
 
22 Evidence is based on a combination of personal observation at some of the court proceedings between 
February and June, 2014; and official documentation of these proceedings filed by the ATF. 
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of international grants and ultimately market-like performance-based payments, it is the 
more-than-carbon political economies of timber and non-timber forest produce that wreak 
immediate consequences for communities and local resources users. It is also at this level 
that the impacts of emergent property relations partly negotiated through discourses find 
expression in material terms. 
 
 
6.0      Conclusion 
 
This paper has analysed a political ecology of REDD+ in Nigeria, focusing on the complexities 
of property relations and the accumulation-exclusion dialectic which underpins various 
forms of carbonised exclusion. Through the case of Nigeria, it has sought to advance two 
main claims. The first is that emergent tenure complexities and the effects they are 
precipitating are not problems which a discrete REDD+ policy suddenly encounters ‘out 
there’. Rather these conditions are immanent to the contested terrain constituted in part by 
REDD+ proposals, proponents’ discourses and practices geared towards securing the forest 
for REDD+. Nigeria’s REDD+ proposals and their implementation do not only reinforce state 
control of forests, they also authorise and justify a range of actions including the re- 
specification of local forest governance through clustering, the militarisation of the forests 
landscape, the widespread exclusion of local resources users from the forest economy, and 
elite capital accumulation. 
The second major claim advanced in this paper is that the regime of resource exclusion 
through which emergent property rights play out and a carbon forestry economy is 
facilitated also constitutes a collateral political economy of more-than-carbon resources. 
This is what this paper advances as carbonised exclusion. As demonstrated in the case of 
Nigeria, carbonised exclusion manifests through a political economy in which claims to 
carbon mitigation legitimise a militarised exclusion of local forest users from timber and 
non-timber forest resources, while facilitating elite capital accumulation. As such, 
carbonised exclusion extends the accumulation – exclusion dialectic, showing how analyst 
must pay attention to not only carbon-based value creation but also to layers of more-than- 
carbon economies which are legitimised by carbon claims. At the same time, carbonised 
exclusion would prove useful as an analytical category to interrogate similar processes in 
REDD+ and other carbon forestry projects elsewhere. 
While technocentric scholarship on REDD+ property relations admits the existence of the 
kind of complexities that carbonised exclusion represents; it however does not often 
acknowledge that REDD+ policies and practices cannot be isolated from analyses of such 
complexities unfolding across locales (see Awono et al., 2014; Resosudarmo et al., 2014; 
Sunderlin et al., 2013). Rather measures such as intensified law enforcement, moratorium, 
militarisation which are becoming common means for pursuing REDD+ (see Cavanagh et al., 
2015) are taken by technocentric scholars as “alternative policy options” through which 
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REDD+ implementers seek to address tenure complexities in locales (Bolin et al., 2013 p1). 
But these measures, as demonstrated in the case of Nigeria, only further complicate 
resource relations rather than resolve them. Specifically, a totalizing moratorium together 
with the militarisation of the forest is driving greater levels of illegality, with adverse impacts 
on both the forest sustainability and local forest access and governance. As such, emergent 
complexities in REDD+, as exemplified by carbonised exclusion analysed in this paper cannot 
be understood outside of these alternative REDD+ policy measures, which in Nigeria as 
elsewhere, efface the reality of rural poverty, weak institutions, historical conditions, and 
entrenched self-interest among the varieties of actors summoned by REDD+. 
Conversely, political ecology critically scrutinizes these complexities as partly immanent to 
REDD+ policies and practices, and as partly constituted through ongoing struggles, histories 
and geographies of specific places. Framing these complexities in terms of carbonised 
exclusion expands existing understanding of the political ecology of carbon forestry. It does 
so by further specifying the accumulation – exclusion dialectic which has been fundamental 
to materialist critiques of carbon forestry and by showing how more-than-carbon political 
economies are of immediate and possibly greater implications for local communities and 
forest sustainability than the carbon economy proper. 
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